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PP. 520. HARDCOVER $88.00. PAPERBACK $34.99.
JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD (HARVARD UNIVERSITY
PRESS 2015). PP. 416. HARDCOVER $39.95.

In 1764, the Italian philosopher Cesare Beccaria made the case for eliminating
the death sentence in an essay entitled On Crimes and Punishments. Capital punishment,
he argued, made mercy necessary to soften its cruelty, especially when imposed for
minor crimes. But any modification to the punishment mandated by the laws violated
the principle that “the authority of making penal laws can only reside with the legislator, who represents the whole society united by the social compact.”1 According to
Beccaria, the pardon, “one of the noblest prerogatives of the throne,” acted as “a
tacit disapprobation of the laws,” prompting his proclamation that “[h]appy [is] the
nation in which [clemency] will be considered as dangerous!”2 He continued, arguing
that absurdly harsh laws also obliged judges to interpret, rather than to apply, laws.
Legislating from the bench, like sovereign pardons, led to arbitrary power and posed
a danger to liberty. After brandishing these criticisms, Beccaria wrote, “I should have
every thing to fear if tyrants were to read my book; but tyrants never read.”3
More than a few American colonists read this essay, including George Washington and lead drafter of the U.S. Constitution, James Madison.4 So did John Adams,
Thomas Jefferson, William Bradford, James Wilson, and Dr. Benjamin Rush. Jefferson listed On Crimes and Punishments among the six most important works on civil

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law. I am grateful to Catherine Evans for reading
an earlier draft.
1. CESARE BECCARIA, AN ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT, 20 (Edward D. Ingraham trans., 2d ed. 1819).
2. Id. at 198.
3. Id. at 26.
4. JOHN D. BESSLER, THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN LAW: AN ITALIAN PHILOSOPHER AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 151, 173 (2014).
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government.5 The revolutionary ideas that the founding fathers applied to the new
American government included the separation of powers, the basis of Beccaria’s critique of the death penalty. Upon defeating British tyranny, several state legislatures,
including Pennsylvania, New York, and Virginia, revised their penal codes to replace
frequent grants of clemency under draconian laws with milder punishments and
fewer pardons.6 “[C]apital punishments,” Rush declared, “are the natural offspring
of monarchical governments.”7
In the American experience, criminal laws and their enforcement have been
profoundly connected to the constitution of government and the health of democracy. As a preeminent judge once commented, the “quality of a nation’s civilization
can be largely measured by the methods it uses in the enforcement of its criminal
law.”8
This essay reviews three recently published books that further explore this insight in the twentieth century. At first glance, vagrancy laws, the free will problem,
and criminal records may seem to share little in common. But each study illuminates
how criminal laws have defined our nation by creating what historian Barbara Welke
has termed “borders of belonging,” a boundary that laws create between people who
enjoy full citizenship and those who do not.9 After all, a conviction and imprisonment
are acts of social and political exclusion. Even the policing of suspected offenders
often reveals who does not completely belong.
The reviewed books are also distinctly modern tales, in which questions of identity—whether and which individuals are free to determine and reimagine who they
are—inform both the workings of the criminal justice system and inclusion into the
body politic. In addition to highlighting the importance of criminal justice to constitutional studies, this review essay brings attention to what history can offer legal
scholars, law students, and activists.
A PLURALIST CONSTITUTION
Given the foundational role of criminal law in constituting the American polity,
it is not too surprising that constitutional law historian Risa Goluboff’s latest book
examines the demise of vagrancy laws during the “long 1960s” (specifically, from
1949 to 1972).10 These age-old status-crime laws targeting beggars, habitual loafers,
common drunkards, prostitutes, disorderly people, and even jugglers may at first appear trivial compared to laws on, say, voting rights or anti-discrimination. But, as
5. Louis P. Masur, The Revision of the Criminal Law in Post-Revolutionary America, 8 CRIM. JUST. HIST. 21, 23 (1987).
6. See, e.g., STEVEN WILF, LAW’S IMAGINED REPUBLIC: POPULAR POLITICS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN
REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 165 (2010); Masur, supra note 5, at 21.
7. BENJAMIN RUSH, CONSIDERATIONS ON THE INJUSTICE AND IMPOLICY OF PUNISHING MURDER BY DEATH
18 (1792).
8. Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 26 (1956). The article was
delivered in April 1956 as the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School.
9. BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, LAW AND THE BORDERS OF BELONGING IN THE LONG NINETEENTH
CENTURY UNITED STATES 144 (2010).
10. On the debate over the periodization of the “Sixties,” see, e.g., M. J. Heale, The Sixties as History: A Review of the
Political Historiography, 33 REV. IN AM. HIST. 133, 135-36 (2005).
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Goluboff explains, vaguely and broadly worded vagrancy laws offered police a flexible, easy-to-use tool for subjecting anyone “out of place” to the criminal process.11
By mid-twentieth century, those subjects included not just vagrants in the common
meaning of the word, but also communists, civil rights activists, anti-war protestors,
interracial couples, and individuals with indicia of nonconformity like men with
beards. After centuries of unquestioned legitimacy, vagrancy laws began to seem
problematic not just to their alleged offenders, but also to Ivy League trained lawyers.
By 1972, when the Supreme Court in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville finally invalidated a vagrancy ordinance whose vagueness had given beat officers virtually unlimited discretion to patrol the “borders of belonging,” no less than the Constitution’s
meaning had changed. The nation’s highest court had embraced a new understanding
of constitutional rights—of belonging—that protected more than different political
views; it also validated lifestyle choices that defied dominant mores.
Until Vagrant Nation, no one had realized that every social movement of the
1960s had confronted the punitive discipline of what Goluboff refers to as “the vagrancy law regime.”12 Looking back through this new framework adds substantial
support for the depiction of the sixties as a period that moved towards greater diversity and inclusiveness rather than one mired in discord and disintegration.13 What
labor unionists, gay rights advocates, the Civil Rights Movement, the Counterculture,
anti-war protestors, and poor people all had in common was a pluralist vision of
America. They demanded a place in the community of rights-bearing individuals free
from police harassment. By identifying a unifying theme for an unruly decade,
Goluboff has distilled the essential conflict in American society at the time. At the
heart of every social movement was a challenge to the authority of a white, capitalist,
middle-class, heterosexual, and male-dominated culture.
Notwithstanding the ambitiousness of the project, Goluboff describes her book
as “a, not the, legal history of the sixties.”14 She leaves out some perspectives because
“the focus of [her] story always remains [on] vagrancy laws and their challengers.”15
One of those unexamined perspectives is the other side of vagrancy litigation: advocates of policing. As a result, the book at times reads like hearing one side of a telephone call; the listener can fill in most of what the other side is saying, but not everything. In Goluboff’s account of the legal cases that culminated with the invalidation
of vagrancy laws, it is clear enough that the police had a mandate to maintain social
order and safety. But what Vagrant Nation does not entirely capture is how widespread
and deep was the appeal of security that vagrancy policing was intended to provide.
As Goluboff explains, policing vagrants—that is, anyone “out of place”—meant policing difference, which explains why the Papachristou opinion celebrated its opposite,
11. RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION 3 (2016).
12. Id. at 10.
13. Compare, e.g., JOHN M. BLUM, YEARS OF DISCORD: AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, 1961-1974 (1991);
MAURICE ISSERMAN & MICHAEL KAZIN, AMERICA DIVIDED: THE CIVIL WAR OF THE 1960S (1999); with, e.g.,
DAVID FARBER, THE AGE OF GREAT DREAMS: AMERICA IN THE 1960S (1994); DAVID CHALMERS, AND THE
CROOKED PLACES MADE STRAIGHT: THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE 1960S (2nd ed. 1996).
14. GOLUBUFF, supra note 11, at 10.
15. Id. at 9.
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nonconformity. Twenty-first-century Americans may readily understand the allure of
individualism and cultural and racial pluralism. More difficult to appreciate is not just
mainstream Americans’ fear of difference at mid-century, but also their desire for
sameness. That fear and desire both stemmed from the same place, from the need
for security during the postwar, Cold War, atomic age. According to historian Elaine
Tyler May, security was associated with the warmth of domestic life after years of
economic depression, a period of wartime separation, and continuing nuclear threats
from abroad.16 The suburban home outfitted with the latest consumer goods for the
breadwinning father, his homemaker wife, and a couple of children represented security and freedom. Many Americans conformed to this familial and economic
model, or at least aspired to it, and for them, rejections of that way of life seemed
more dangerous than giving police a great deal of discretionary authority to enforce
social norms. Vagrant Nation does discuss the imperatives of law and order, but that
impulse came from more than the need for streets clear of riffraff or the alarming
scenes of urban riots in the later years of the sixties. It flowed deeply from a particular
idea of liberty and happiness.
Vagrant Nation ends in 1972 with Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, which represented a victory for a pluralist United States. Interestingly, the conclusion is not quite
triumphant, but measured with reality. In Goluboff’s telling, the Court shied away
from the more difficult task of formulating a fundamental right to be free from police
harassment. Instead, it voided the vagrancy ordinance for being too vague, which
permitted order-maintenance policing to continue as long as legislators rewrote laws
that spelled out the offensive conduct (these include today’s anti-loitering and drug
laws). Also, the Court decided Papachristou only after it had already approved the police practice of stops and frisks in the 1968 case Terry v. Ohio. Vagrancy challengers
sought to eliminate both sources of discretionary authority—vague vagrancy laws and
stop-and-frisks—that empowered beat officers to decide questions of belonging as
they patrolled the streets. But constitutionally legitimizing stops and frisks was what
made the invalidation of vagrancy laws more palatable and thus possible. In other
words, abolishing or severely cutting back on policing as a method of social control
never seemed to be an option on the table. Finally, while Goluboff recognizes the
“revolutionary” changes that the pluralists had achieved, she points out that “they
did not demand complete equality, inclusion, or freedom.”17 Our vagrant nation may
be a vastly more tolerant one, but it is still not without inequality, exclusion, or coercion.
The reasons for this partial victory may lie in the faults of human nature. Or it
could suggest the enduring desire for security based on middle-class values and gendered and racial norms. Or it could reflect the process of legal advocacy, which is the

16. Elaine Tyler May, Cold War—Warm Hearth: Politics and the Family in Postwar America, in THE RISE AND FALL
OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980, 158-68 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle ed., 1989). See also ARTHUR M.
SCHLESINGER JR., THE VITAL CENTER: THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM 2 (1949) (“Yet for the United States the world
tragedy still has the flickering unreality of a motion picture. It grips us as we see it; but, lingering over the familiar
milkshake in the bright drugstore, we forget the nightmare in the resurgence of warmth and comfort.”).
17. GOLUBUFF, supra note 11, at 337.
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explanation that Goluboff explores. Vagrant Nation traces the path from social problem to constitutional right: how lawyers had come to identify a problem in the real
world, converted it into legal questions, tried out different strategies, and taken the
most viable or desirable arguments all the way to the Supreme Court again and again
until they succeeded. One lesson of Vagrant Nation is that reform by litigation often
has a winnowing effect that ends up “crowd[ing] out other possible solutions to the
problem.”18 A legal movement might end with a hard-won constitutional right that
addresses only one facet of a larger social problem.
But lawyers cannot take all the blame for the shortcomings, just as they cannot
receive all the credit for the successes. The history of vagrancy law shows how complicated narratives of legal change can be. Forces beyond the work of lawyers were at
play as well. With or without lawyers, American society was changing. Vagrant Nation
recounts many of these transformations, including the sexual revolution and the coming of age of the Baby Boomer generation. Notably, vagrancy-law challenges turned
an important corner when police began to harass and arrest middle-class, white teenagers. They “made hippies familiar to lawyers, reporters, and judges, who might have
had children, siblings, or other relatives making similar, if disparaged, choices.”19 No
doubt, the work of lawyers became all the easier when judges began to empathize
with the defendants appearing before them. It marked a truly transformative social
change when a sitting justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, the most elite level of the
legal profession and, frankly, society as well, would exaggerate his past as a hobo and
relish being mistaken for a tramp.20 This then raises a question about the contours of
change. Is the story about greater acceptance of those in the margins of society? Or
is it about how the marginal became mainstream? Goluboff describes the demise of
vagrancy laws as “shockingly quick—twenty years is a metaphorical blink of an eye
given a four-hundred-year-old regime.”21 Perhaps such swiftness was possible because of deeper changes occurring over a longer period of time. For instance, economic shifts and technological innovations played important roles in transforming
how individuals understood themselves in the modern world.22
This is not to dismiss cause litigation as striving towards the inevitable. The
dynamic between individual agency and structure is a conundrum that historians will
endlessly debate. Goluboff has chosen to focus on how legal actors participated in a
larger story by working out social issues through law. For Goluboff, it made sense to
adopt this perspective because she sees law as central to life in twentieth-century
America.23 The social conflicts of that era were fundamentally legal problems precisely because, in Goluboff’s words, “the laws were critical to the maintenance of an
18. Id. at 334.
19. Id. at 257.
20. Id. at 106.
21. Id. at 8.
22. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 12, 169 (1930) (on “agencies of menace”).
23. Christopher Tomlins would point out that law was central in American life not just in the twentieth century,
but even earlier, beginning in the mid-eighteenth century. CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY
IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 21 (1993).
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increasingly contested order and hierarchy in American society.”24 Of course, the
tumult of the sixties reflected other problems as well, such as racism. But Goluboff’s
point is that vagrancy laws provided a one-size-fits-all tool for defending the status
quo amidst change in every dimension. Law was so embedded in the life and governance of American society that it was difficult for vagrancy challengers to diagnose
what, exactly, was the problem with the laws that made them vulnerable to police
harassment. It has also made it easy to forget, until now, how momentous their victory had been. Overthrowing the vagrancy-law regime was an important moment in
U.S. history. By focusing on action in the courts that spilled in from the streets, Vagrant Nation highlights the difference that diffused and outnumbered protest movements actually made. Defending their way of life had changed the meaning of the
Constitution.
THE WILL TO BE PUNISHED
Thomas Green’s magnum opus employs a different organizing framework to
examine one hundred years of criminal law scholarship: the free will problem, that is,
the tension between belief in individual agency on the one hand and the idea that
historical, environmental, and biological conditions determine that agency on the
other. This is a productive approach to studying the intellectual foundation of the
American state, for our understanding of the human condition—the answer to the
irresolvable question, to what degree do we freely choose our actions?—has marked
the boundaries of the state’s most coercive power, the power to punish. So it is that
the metaphysical definition of human freedom and how it ought to restrain state
power has informed the entire criminal process. The free will problem appears in
nearly every major issue related to crime and punishment: the definition of crime, the
validity of defenses, the role of juries and experts, the relevance of evidence, the treatment of juveniles, and sentencing and prison reform. The history of the free will
problem is thus of utmost importance to anyone interested in how criminal laws and
procedure have defined a person’s most elemental status as a self-determining being.
In the United States, this determination has qualified the rights of criminal defendants
and decided the suitability of punishment versus treatment, all of which implicated
questions of belonging.25
Rather than delving into real-world consequences, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility offers an indefatigable exercise in intellectual history. The project, as Green has
defined its scope, was to read every significant text on the free will problem written
by law professors over the course of a century. The book begins with Gino Speranza,
an obscure Italian lawyer in fin de siècle New York who acted as a “missionary to lawyers” bringing the truths of behavioral science.26 It then lingers over Roscoe Pound’s

24. GOLUBUFF, supra note 11, at 8.
25. See, e.g., MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE ERA CHICAGO
(2003) (on how the treatment of juvenile delinquents, deadbeat fathers, and poor women in specialized municipal
courts often violated their due process rights).
26. THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, FREEDOM AND CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
30 (2014).
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legal progressivism before proceeding seriatim, covering—to list a random selection—Sheldon Glueck, John Wigmore, Francis Sayre, Jerome Hall, Thurman Arnold,
three Herberts (Wechsler, Hart, and Morris), Henry Hart, Michael Moore, Lloyd
Weinreb, Sanford Kadish, Joshua Dressler, Peter Arenella, John Hill, Richard Boldt,
and more.
The ambitiousness of the book, however, has its limits. In the postmodern era
of critical scholarship, it is a curious choice to remain solely in the realm of written
words and to describe them at face value. Green himself will not be surprised by this
critique, for he “readily admit[s] that [his] account is less a history, as that term is now
conventionally understood, and more a sketchbook.”27 The exclusive examination of
ideas worked out in scholarly monographs, without adding much context, is a methodology that historians have faulted for some time.28 This essay will not rehash those
criticisms and instead consider the tradeoffs.
Among the benefits is that Green’s thoughtful textual analyses provide an invaluable resource to anyone who would like to know more about what a particular
legal academic wrote about criminal responsibility. But Green did not intend for his
tome to serve as a reference book. Reading everything on one topic over a long
timeframe has enabled Green to observe big-picture shifts in a debate that, at any
particular moment, may seem to dissipate into a cacophony of views. These observations form an “impressionistic narrative” about how academic writing on the problem of free will changed over the twentieth century.29
In brief, Green identifies three moments of shift in the scholarly literature and
accordingly divides the book into three parts. The first period, from the turn of the
century to the 1920s, comprised the heyday of determinism. During this Progressive
Era, law professors were occupied with incorporating the determinist lessons of the
social sciences into a legal system that was based on the existence of free will.
Moving onto the “forgotten years” of the 1930s to the 1960s, progressivism
retreated as even positivist scholars began searching for ways to reincorporate traditional ideas of free will and just deserts into the criminal process.30 One example of
what Green calls the “wages of conventional morality” is the “as if” proposition that
did not accept free will as truth, but nevertheless treated it as a useful idea.31 In other
words, the justice system could exact punishment “as if” individuals exercised free
will. Another example is Jerome Michael and Herbert Wechsler’s attempt to sweep
general deterrence under the banner of utilitarianism.32 Instead of relying on oldfashioned retribution, they justified individual punishment on its societal benefits.

27. Id. at 477.
28. For criticisms, see, e.g., William W. Fisher III, Texts and Contexts: The Application to American Legal History of the
Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065, 1067-72 (1997); Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding
in the History of Ideas, 8 HIST. & THEORY 3 (1969).
29. GREEN, supra note 26, at 4.
30. Id. at 125.
31. Id. at 135, 187-88.
32. See id. at 170.
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Finally, the 1960s to the present witnessed the emergence of “neo-retributivism.”33 Rather than harking back to vengeance-based punishment, modern desert
theories were based on new ideas of personhood that included a “‘right’ to punishment” (more on this below), or a compatibilist belief in both free will and determinism, or agnosticism about both.34 Even in this return to retributivism, Green sees
progressivism’s indelible influence on criminal legal thought that made a complete
reversion to traditional understandings impossible.
As it turns out, the shifts that Green traces are not too surprising, given what
we already know about Progressive Era reforms, the revival of rule-of-law values
amidst midcentury fears of totalitarianism, and the war on crime followed by the War
on Drugs in what one historian has called the “severity revolution.”35 To be sure, it
is interesting to confirm how closely abstract inquiries into individual will and responsibility have mapped onto political events. Even law professors do not reason in a
vacuum, leaving one to wonder, just how determined is legal thought?
Notwithstanding the jab at legal academics, it goes to make a point about
Green’s methodological choices. The “small world” of law professors appealed to
Green because they played the dual roles of “truth-seeker and prescriptivist.”36 Their
legible struggle to integrate the scientific truth of determinism into a workable criminal legal system that can attribute responsibility and mete out punishment produced
a great deal of source material for the intellectual historian. But this is precisely why
it is disappointing that Green narrowed his inquiry to ideas found in the pages of law
review articles. The role of prescriptivist plays out in the real world of constraints, or,
in a word, politics. Arguably, so also the role of truth-seeker. This explains one of
Green’s recurring themes that “juristic positivists rarely challenged the idea of free
will head-on.”37 Legal academics could not declare that free will did not exist when
its existence often proved inescapable in specific cases, policy questions, and doctrinal debates. The need for compromise, or resort to avoidance, explains some aspects
of the legal system we have today. One of Green’s examples is the bifurcated criminal
process, in which conventional morality informs the guilt stage while scientific determinism informs the sentencing stage. These passages that discuss particular issues in
the context of the free will problem—the other examples include the role of criminal
juries and the insanity defense—are where the reading is most interesting. The reason
goes to the heart of what draws us to history. We study the past not simply to know
who said what, but to understand the “why” question.
To be sure, the “what” question is crucial to history as well, for it precedes
questions of causation. Green recognizes that what he has extended is a launching
pad for other historians “who will perhaps seek to contextualize and elaborate on the

33. Id. at 286.
34. GREEN, supra note 26, at 317-18.
35. Michael Willrich, Criminal Justice in the United States, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA 195,
199, 222 (Michael Grossberg & Chirstopher Tomlins ed., 2008).
36. GREEN, supra note 26, at 3.
37. Id. at 169.
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ideas [he has] traced.”38 Indeed, Freedom and Criminal Responsibility offers much to mine
for future studies. For instance, Green’s analysis of Herbert Morris’s “Persons and
Punishment” makes no note of significant paradoxes that come to light only in social
and political context.39 The essay sought to prove that individuals had a “‘fundamental’ right to be treated as a person,” which included the choice to commit an offense,
which, in turn, entailed a choice to be punished.40 According to Green, Morris’s essay
marked “a more resolute turn to what might be called neo-retributivism.”41 But
whence did the reemergence of retributivism come? Green writes that Morris was
responding to the scientific positivism of Bertrand Russell, B. F. Skinner, Benjamin
Karpman, and Karl Menninger.42 But the year of its publication, 1968, suggests a
larger story. It was a year overcome with what one historian describes as “rip tides,”
with the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert Kennedy, the Tet Offensive, and student protests around the world.43 These currents crested during a
period of sharper and broader claims to individual rights (Goluboff’s Vagrant Nation
provides one account). Perhaps we can see Morris’s “right to punishment” of a piece
with the sixties’ rights movements. If so, there is a poignant irony that the very notion
of individual agency that powered the decade’s social and legal activism also served
as the basis for neo-retributivism—an irony that comes to the fore in the racialized
war on crime. Even more, it would expose the tensions in twentieth-century liberalism if the “right to punishment” fed the rhetoric of personal responsibility that would
soon reverse the War on Poverty’s attempts to address the social roots of crime.44
Recent books suggest further twists to the plot. According to Naomi Murakawa
and Elizabeth Hinton, the carceral state had its origins right at this liberal moment,
when the War on Poverty included a war on crime that was based on notions of black
pathology, which policymakers attributed to inequality, poverty, and urbanity.45 Was
Morris also responding to this determinist understanding of crime that rationalized
large investments not just in social welfare but also in law enforcement? If so, then
how might the history of the free will problem illuminate the contradictions in liberalism in the late twentieth century? How far did the idea of the person in criminal
legal philosophy find its way into political discourse? Green hints that how enthusiastically subsequent scholars adopted Morris’s concept of human autonomy “may
well have depended – it is hard to be certain about this – on the particular social
justification for retributive punishment that one found persuasive.”46 It remains for
other scholars to sort out the strands of determinism and free will underlying the
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 477.
See id. at 317-24.
Id. at 318-19, 321.
GREEN, supra note 26, at 317.
Id. at 318.
TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE MOVEMENT AND THE SIXTIES: PROTEST IN AMERICA FROM GREENSBORO TO
WOUNDED KNEE 183 (1995).
44. See DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE (2011) (describing how theories about society and social utility
were fractured into theories of individualism).
45. ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME (2016); NAOMI MURAKAWA,
THE FIRST CIVIL RIGHT: HOW LIBERALS BUILT PRISON AMERICA (2014).
46. GREEN, supra note 26, at 324.
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policies that have created the justice system that we have today.
CRIMINAL BIOGRAPHIES
In The Eternal Criminal Record, James Jacobs traces the path of a criminal record,
from the rap sheet created upon arrest at the local police station to the integrated,
“national rap sheet” system called Triple I (for Interstate Identification Index), from
court records created upon an individual’s first court appearance to entry in a commercial database. He does not stop there. Jacobs follows the record into the hands
of sentencing judges, probation officers, immigration officers, social welfare workers,
college admissions officers, potential landlords and employers. Expungement is difficult to procure and often comes too late. In any case, a record never really disappears in the information age. Individuals with criminal records have a harder time
getting into college and finding jobs, both of which go a long way to staying out of
trouble and becoming a productive member of society. They also lose various constitutional rights, including the rights to vote, serve on a jury, hold office, and bear
arms. The justice system, by leaving a written trail of misdeeds, erects impenetrable
“borders of belonging,” using Welke’s phrasing, and creates “second-class citizens by
law,” in Jacobs’ words.47
Jacobs’ depiction of the reality confronting those with criminal records is tragic
enough. But it is even more heartbreaking when we see the problem following the
history of vagrancy laws, for the person with a record has become the new vagrant.
The “eternal criminal record” not only exacts an additional, lasting punishment; it
also creates a status that justifies harsher treatment at every step of the criminal process, beginning with extra scrutiny from law enforcement. To be sure, the eternal
criminal record is not an exact replica of the vagrancy law regime, although both
function similarly to comparable ends. The contribution of historical studies to legal
studies lies not so much in revealing how history repeats itself. Rather, knowledge of
the past can help us to see the full scope of today’s injustices. In a passage that evokes
Vagrant Nation, Jacobs writes, “The police give greater attention to an individual listed
in an organized crime, gang, or other criminal intelligence database. In deciding
whether there is probable cause to arrest, the police will be more likely to detain,
search, and arrest the person who has a criminal record.”48 Even more reminiscent
of vagrancy policing, criminal recordkeeping places a tremendous amount of power
in the hands of police officers since an arrest, even if it never leads to prosecution or
conviction, generates a record. As a result, the police’s discretion to make an arrest
or not can be all that separates full citizens from legally and socially marginalized
individuals, similar to how that same discretionary authority had segregated citizens
from vagrants at midcentury. A case that Jacobs discusses is illustrative. In Paul v.
Davis, decided in 1976, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Constitution did not
prohibit the police from sending local businesses an “Active Shoplifters” circular with

47. WELKE, supra note 9 at 144; JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 246 (2015).
48. JACOBS, supra note 47, at 2-3.
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the names and pictures of persons who had previously been arrested for shoplifting.49
The criminal record has effectively become, as Jacobs puts it, “the modern equivalent
of branding.”50 It labels and discriminates with complete legal legitimacy.
Throughout the book, Jacobs discusses the justifications for the various policies
that have led to this result. An obvious one is security. For example, assembling investigative and intelligence databases serves crime control needs, while making records accessible to the public is believed to protect vulnerable people like neighborhood children from past sex offenders, and elderly residents from former swindlers.
According to Jacobs, both common experience and empirical data support the underlying premise that individuals act “‘in character.’”51 Apparently, past behavior usually indicates future behavior, regardless of time served in between. Interestingly, the
public’s understanding of predictive criminality suggests that determinism—which in
Green’s book was associated with elite legal thinkers and contrasted against “common views” of “conventional morality” based on free will—has penetrated the lay
mind as well.52
Another rationale for criminal recordkeeping practices is the value of transparency at the heart of democratic government. The idea, articulated in cases like In re
Gault, is that keeping court records confidential encourages secret proceedings, which
in turn invite arbitrariness, abuse of authority, and discrimination.53 Several ironies
come to mind. For one thing, the fear of arbitrary judicial and administrative power
that motivated public access to records in the first place has ended up redoubling the
police’s discretionary power, in light of how a criminal record magnifies the consequences of the police’s decision to arrest. Moreover, as Jacobs notes, the “more transparent and efficient the criminal records system, the less chance an ex-offender has
to blend successfully into society.”54 At least for critics of over-criminalization and
mass incarceration, which disproportionately harm racial minorities, current policies
appear to overvalue transparency at the expense of other democratic values.
An important part of The Eternal Criminal Record is devoted to highlighting “the
criminal record policy choices that have been made or ignored and identif[ying]
choices still open to us.”55 To advance the possibility of reform, Jacobs argues that
open criminal records are not an inevitable feature of open government. For support,
an especially illuminating chapter offers a comparison of the accessibility of conviction records in the United States and in Spain. Although both countries value individual privacy and public courts, Spanish courts tend to choose the former and American courts favor the latter when the two values conflict, resulting in a “stark
difference” between their policies.56 The more important point, however, is that the
Spanish judicial system still promotes the virtues and the general-deterrence goals of
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 205.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 119.
GREEN, supra note 26, at 10.
JACOBS, supra note 47, at 183.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 164.
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transparency by, for example, publishing opinions with defendants’ names anonymized. Private and public needs need not be seen as mutually exclusive.
One question that such comparative analyses raise is: to what extent do policy
differences reflect differences in constitutional culture, which could make legal
change more difficult? One distinct aspect of American constitutionalism that many
scholars, including Jacobs, have identified is its strong protection of the First Amendment. In the context of criminal records, free speech poses a hurdle so high that
efforts to shut down businesses that basically engage in blackmail—posting mug
shots online and requiring a fee to remove them—have, in Jacobs’ estimation, no
certain chance of surviving a First Amendment challenge.57 As another example, laws
that prohibit the media from publishing the names of convicted rapists as well as
their victims have run afoul of the First Amendment. Such a premium on free speech
principles has Jacobs convinced that “European-type data protection, especially for
criminal records, [is] inconceivable in the United States.”58 So, then, how is legal
change possible when confronting an entrenched constitutional tradition?59
This is where history can be helpful. Goluboff’s Vagrant Nation offers an account of a different, but just as cherished, constitutional tradition that has not only
repudiated the criminalization of status; it also celebrates the inclusion of people from
marginalized political, social, racial, and cultural backgrounds into a nation of rightsbearing citizens. We can—and should—invoke this tradition as well. Another lesson
of histories of constitutional outsiders is to show how constitutional meanings have
changed dramatically and frequently over time. The moral of these narratives is not
necessarily that constitutional history devolves into political history. Legal historian
Dirk Hartog once commented on the paradox of how solid and permanent constitutional rights seem, even to those seeking to destabilize others’ rights while endowing
their own rights claims with immanent and fixed meaning.60 Both insiders and outsiders alike have taken part in a shared culture and language of constitutional rights
that evolve even as they are rooted in history. Threats to this heritage come not from
those who seek change, but from those who have given up and reject it altogether.
Books like The Eternal Criminal Record that show how current policies perpetuate injustice are important to keeping alive the “constitution of aspiration.”61 Perhaps what
change may come of it will someday be one for the history books.
We still have to reckon with the difficult realization that complete equality remains elusive despite constitutional change. Perhaps theologians and philosophers
are better suited than historians to explain the persistence of injustice and suffering.
Most historians pay scant attention to the constants of humanity, disclaim the idea
that history repeats itself, and instead emphasize change. And yet, many find their

57. Id. at 86-87.
58. Jacobs, supra note 47, at 177.
59. Most recently, the Second Circuit overturned a trial judge’s expungement of all records of a valid criminal
conviction, citing lack of jurisdiction. Doe v. United States, No. 15-1967, 2016 WL 4245425 (2d Cir. Aug. 11, 2016).
60. Hendrik Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and “The Rights That Belong to Us All,” 74 J. AM. HIST. 1013 (1987).
61. Id. at 1016.
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research topics in the pressing issues of their times. Marc Bloch spoke of this connection between past and present when he wrote, “I am a historian. Therefore, I love
life.”62 Although the historians are right that history cannot tell us what we ought to
do today, it is a human impulse to understand our present through the past. There is
truth to this impulse. History brings perspective to contemporary problems and seeks
to explain their development. As much as I recommend each of the books reviewed
here—two on legal history and one on contemporary law—I suggest even more enthusiastically to read all three together.

62. MARC BLOCH, THE HISTORIAN’S CRAFT 43 (Peter Putnam, trans., 1954).
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